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Abstract 
 
Over the last few years a large number of security 
patterns have been proposed. However, this large 
number of patterns has created a problem in selecting 
patterns that are appropriate for different security re-
quirements. In this paper, we present a selection ap-
proach for security patterns, which allows us to under-
stand in depth the trade-offs involved in the patterns 
and the implications of a pattern to various security 
requirements. Moreover, our approach supports the 
search for a combination of security patterns that will 
meet given security requirements.  
  
1. Introduction 
 
A considerable effort from the industrial and aca-
demic world is focused on the solution of problems 
related to the security of software systems and it is now 
generally accepted that security should be treated as 
part of the software system development process [1] 
and from the early stages of the software system devel-
opment process [3], not as an afterthought. 
However, an important issue on realizing the above 
is the lack of security expertise by a large number of 
software engineers [4]. Towards the solution of this 
problem, security patterns have been proposed. Securi-
ty patterns capture design experience and proven solu-
tions to security-related problems in such a way that 
can be applied by non-security experts.  
Over the last few years the number of security pat-
terns has increased considerably [6]. Although this 
situation has been beneficial for the development of 
secure software systems, it has created a new problem. 
It is now difficult to select appropriate security patterns 
from the large pool of existing patterns that satisfy the 
security requirements of a system. In fact, representing 
and selecting security patterns remains largely an em-
pirical task [7]. Using current pattern representations, it 
is difficult to recognize, under what conditions a pat-
tern should be selected, and understand the conse-
quences of its application, in particular, when choosing 
between patterns that address the same problem.  
Some efforts [6] [12] have been reported in the lite-
rature focused on identifying and documenting security 
patterns. However they have neglected the issue of 
selecting them. Another line of research [18] [19] [21] 
has focused on modeling the impact of patterns. That 
research is important and we consider it complementa-
ry to our work. However, such research mostly 
represents general guidelines and lack formalization 
that would allow software engineers to verify that the 
selected patterns actually satisfy the security require-
ments.  
In this paper we present such a formalized ap-
proach. Our security patterns selection approach is 
formalized, on one hand, in terms of the Goal-Oriented 
Requirements Language (GRL) [8] and on the other 
hand in terms of Prolog rules. The GRL model shows 
which contributions a pattern makes on security-related 
properties such as confidentiality, and the strengths of 
those contributions. The Prolog rules are used to rea-
son about the evaluation mechanism and to project the 
effect of combining security patterns. Section 2 briefly 
introduces the concept of security patterns and intro-
duces our work. Section 3 describes a pattern search 
engine and Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Proposed Approach  
 
The goal of our approach is to assist a designer with 
the selection of security patterns by a) helping them 
navigate through a possibly large set of patterns or 
unfamiliar ones through annotations to the patterns 
(such as impact on NFRs), and b) documenting the 
rationale for selecting those patterns. The output of 
pattern selection is a list of patterns, as well the list of 
requirements that will be met by them and the underly-
ing forces as a way of explaining the selection. 
The concept of patterns originated as an idea in the 
area of architecture [9] at the late 1970s. According to 
Alexander et al. [9], a pattern is a three-part rule that 
defines a relationship between a context, a system of 
forces that occurs repeatedly in that context, and a so-
lution which allows these forces to resolve themselves. 
Forces are design trade-offs affected by the pattern.  
In our work, the selection of security patterns is 
formalized in terms of the Goal-oriented Requirements 
Language (GRL) and Prolog rules. GRL supports rea-
soning about requirements, and is especially appropri-
ate for dealing with non-functional requirements 
(NFRs). A GRL model can show the contributions that 
a pattern makes on security-related NFRs, and the 
strength of those contributions. The effect of combin-
ing patterns can be visualized, but also be reasoned 
about using an evaluation mechanism. Prolog rules can 
also be used at this stage: the type and strength of con-
tributions, as well as the evaluation mechanism can be 
expressed in terms of Prolog rules. However, using 
Prolog queries we can also use the same pattern repre-
sentation to search for ways of satisfying a specified 
level of contributions. 
Although a number of pattern representations have 
been proposed in the literature, for this work, we em-
ploy the representation proposed by Araujo and Weiss 
[21], which was later refined by Mussbacher et al. [22]. 
The representation is based on GRL, using the notation 
proposed in [8].  This representation allows us to effec-
tively reason about the forces of each security pattern, 
and understand the contributions of each security pat-
tern to the various security forces. In our work, we 
only use a subset of the intentional elements and rela-
tionships provided by the Goal-oriented Requirements 
Language. In particular, we employ task elements 
(modeled as hexagons) to represent patterns, and soft-
goal elements (modeled as clouds) to represent the 
forces of a pattern and NFRs they affect. In addition, 
decomposition links are employed to model the rela-
tionships between patterns and contribution links to 
represent the contributions (positive or negative) that a 
pattern makes to specific forces.  
A pattern can make these contributions: AND con-
tributions are positive and necessary; OR contributions 
positive, but not necessary; MAKE contributions are 
positive and sufficient; HELP indicates that the pattern 
can positively contribute towards a force, but is not 
sufficient; BREAK and HURT are the opposites of 
MAKE and HELP; UNKNOWN indicates that there is 
a contribution from a pattern to a force, but that the 
extent and the sense of the contribution is unknown. 
Consider, for instance, the GRL representation of the 
Single Access Point pattern [6]. Fig. 1 shows a GRL 
model of this pattern. It shows the forces, and their 
impact on security NFRs. So, a Single Access Point 
provides Accountability (NFR) by ensuring Central 
Logging (force) of requests to a system. 
 
Figure 1. GRL model of Single Access Point 
 
Graphically, closed arrow heads indicate AND, and 
open arrow heads indicate OR types of contributions. 
The label on the link indicates the strength of the link. 
In this model, the selection of forces to describe the 
security patterns is based, in part, on the analysis of 
security patterns in terms of their implications on secu-
rity and non-security related NFRs in [7,23]. This 
model was defined in the OmniGraffle diagram editor 
[24], since it was easy to process the XML representa-
tion of the model, and extract the structure of the GRL 
graph, so it could be mapped into Prolog facts. How-
ever, other tools such as OME [25] can be used. 
In the Prolog representation, the different types of 
elements are mapped to goals with a satisfaction level 
and contribution links. Contribution links have strength 
and a type. In particular, all strengths are represented 
numerically, with 0.00 (BREAK), 0.25 (HURT), 0.50 
(UNKOWN), 0.75 (HELP) and 1.00 (MAKE), and a 
type of AND, OR or DEPENDS, which indicate in 
what way the contribution is made. For AND contribu-
tions, the weakest contribution decides about the com-
bined effect, and for OR contributions, the strongest 
contribution. For a DEPENDS link, the satisfaction 
level of the dependee determines the satisfaction level 
of the depender. One way of using DEPENDS links 
here is to model the context in which a pattern is ap-
plied, that is, the user’s requirements. Patterns are 
represented by the following predicate: 
 
pattern(Name, FulfilledNFRs, RequiredNFRs). 
 
where FulfilledNFRs are the NFRs that positively con-
tribute to security requirements, and RequiredNFRs the 
NFRs that negatively contribute to security require-
ments. Consider four well-known security patterns for 
access control: Single Access Point, Check Point, Se-
curity Session, and Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) [6]. These patterns can be represented as:  
 
pattern('Single Access Point', ['Integrity', 
  'Confidentiality', 'Accountability'], ['Availability']). 
pattern('Check Point', ['Availability', 'Integrity',  
  'Confidentiality'], []). 
pattern('Security Session', ['Availability', 'Integrity',  
  'Confidentiality', 'Accountability', 'Usability'], []). 
pattern('RBAC', ['Manageability', 'Availability',  
  'Integrity', 'Confidentiality'], []). 
 
We model uses and conflicts relationships between 
patterns. For the above patterns, we have: 
 
uses(and, 'Single Access Point', 'Check Point'). 
uses(or, 'Check Point', 'Security Session'). 
uses(or, 'Check Point', 'RBAC'). 
 
Moreover, satisfaction levels are expressed as a 
membership function, so that we can use fuzzy logic to 
evaluate a GRL model.  Satisfaction levels can range 
from 0.00 to 1.00. A satisfaction level of 1.00 (0.00) 
means that a goal is fully satisfied (denied). Contribu-
tions links are modeled using a contributes predicate. 
The first argument indicates the type of contribution 
(AND, OR, DEPENDS), and the third argument the 
strength of the contribution. For example, the Single 
Access Point makes an AND contribution of strength 
1.0 toward the goal May Limit Concurrency. Note that 
there are two sets of contributions: from patterns to 
forces, and from forces to NFRs. To obtain the satis-
faction levels of the top-level goals (Availability etc.), 
we recursively follow the contribution links. In Prolog, 
we collect the contributions to each goal, and then run 
an evaluation method for that goal. Before the value 
can be returned, we may need to perform these two 
steps for each contributing subgoal recursively, unless 
they are leaf nodes of the goal graph.  To help collect 
the contributions, we have defined four rules as shown 
in Fig. 2.  
The first three rules handle OR, AND and 
DEPENDS, whereas the last rule looks up the satisfac-
tion level of a terminal node. The evaluation rules are 
defined in Fig. 3. As in fuzzy logic, we evaluate a goal 
graph by taking the maximum over OR contributions 
and the minimum of AND contributions. DEPENDS 
contributions are evaluated to the value of the depen-
dum (dependee), as a depender (dependum) cannot 
have a higher satisfaction level than the dependum 
(dependee). 
The propagate predicate defines how single contri-
butions affect the satisfaction level of a goal. It defines 
how a satisfaction level VA is mapped by applying a 
contribution of strength Lambda into a value VB. In 
the evaluation rules above, we first determine the satis-
faction level of a contributing goal, VAT (the “T” 
represents the tail of the contribution link), then propa-
gate this to a satisfaction level VA. These propagation 
rules create a fixpoint at 0.5 (UNKNOWN). It should 
not be possible to “escape” from an UNKNOWN level 
by some chain of contribution links of HELP or 
MAKE. 
 
 
Figure 2. Collecting the contributions to each goal 
 
 
Figure 3. Recursive evaluation of goal graph 
 
3. Pattern Search Engine 
 
To support the selection of security patterns, we 
have implemented a pattern search engine, which given 
a set of requirements will find sets of patterns that, 
together, will satisfy those requirements. A user re-
quest indicating security and other non-functional re-
quirements provides input to the search engine. The 
search engine then attempts to match those require-
ments against the patterns in a pattern repository. The 
patterns have been annotated with the information 
about the NFRs that each pattern fulfills as well as 
those that it requires, in turn. Relationships between 
patterns are also represented in those annotations. 
% evaluation  rules 
eval(or, [A/K|R], V) :- 
  prove(A, VAT), propagate(VAT, K, VA), eval(or, 
R, VR), max(VA, VR, V). 
eval(or, [A/K], V) :- 
  prove(A, VAT), propagate(VAT, K, V). 
 
eval(and, [A/K|R], V) :- 
  prove(A, VAT), propagate(VAT, K, VA), eval(and, 
R, VR), min(VA, VR, V). 
eval(and, [A/K], V) :- 
  prove(A, VAT), propagate(VAT, K, V). 
 
eval(depends, [A, B], V) :- 
  depends(A, B), prove(B, V). 
% prove a given goal 
  prove(G, V) :- 
     findall(A/K, contributes(or, A, K, G), L), 
    eval(or, L, V). 
  prove(G, V) :- 
    findall(A/K, contributes(and, A, K, G), L), 
    eval(and, L, V). 
  prove(G, V) :- 
    depends(G, D),  
    eval(depends, [G, D], V). 
  prove(G, V) :- 
    mu(G, V), !. 
At the core of the search engine is an algorithm that 
matches patterns against user requirements until either 
there are no more requirements, or no more patterns 
that can be matched against them. The algorithm has 
two main parts: an index function that indexes all pat-
terns according to the set of all the requirements they 
fulfill, and a search function that will search according 
to the user required security requirements. An output 
function returns the selected patterns to the users. 
Intuitively, the algorithm indexes patterns from a 
pattern repository P = {p1,…,pn} according to the set of 
all the requirements N = {n1,…,nk} satisfied by pat-
terns in the repository. Users can search the index 
against their security requirements R ( NR ⊆ ). An 
output function takes any pi that fulfills a user require-
ment and adds it to a set Q ( PQ ⊆ ) that includes the 
patterns that fulfill user requirements.  Since the rela-
tionships of the patterns in the repository are annotated, 
this function also checks for dependencies between 
patterns. One pattern may require another pattern as a 
prerequisite (PREREQ). For example, Single Access 
Point requires Check Point. Therefore, our algorithm 
also returns all the patterns (p.PREREQ) that are pre-
requisite for Pp ⊆ . In addition, the algorithm returns 
the set NF ⊆  of unfulfilled requirements. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we introduced a novel approach to 
find the most suitable security patterns for a given set 
of security and other non-functional requirements. The 
proposed pattern search engine also takes into account 
pattern dependencies, and goodness of fit between the 
requested requirements (security and others) and those 
fulfilled by each security pattern. 
Our work is based on formalizing security patterns 
in terms of the Goal-oriented Requirements Language 
(GRL) and mapping these models into Prolog. As a 
result, the proposed work demonstrates a number of 
novel and important contributions: (i) We focus on the 
explicit consideration of the forces of each pattern for 
the selection process. This allows us to understand, in 
depth, the trade-offs involved in the patterns and the 
implications of this pattern to the various security con-
cerns; (ii) We are concerned with the relationships of 
the patterns at the pattern language level. In reality, 
some security patterns can only be applied after certain 
other security patterns have been already applied. 
Therefore, to effectively select a set of patterns we 
must identify and explicitly consider their relation-
ships; (iii) We formalize the representation of patterns. 
This allows us to effectively and accurately describe 
how each pattern makes a distinct contribution to a 
non-functional security requirement. The formalization 
also allows us to uncover liabilities imposed by a pat-
tern, which are not easy to identify from a textual re-
presentation. Finally, formalization allows us to auto-
mate parts of the pattern selection process. 
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